Kleber Mostachi Lewis. Swinburne considers the Non-Reductionist View to be equivalent to Cartesian dualism. Madell has shown that it need not be. But Parfit has more recently suggested Rca.
|Published (Last):||5 February 2014|
|PDF File Size:||5.65 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||15.74 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Bernstein limits his interpretation of subjectivity to thinkers such as Gadamer and Habermas. The authors analyze the ideas of classic scholars such as Edmund Husserl and Friedrich Nietzsche. Husserl put forward his notion of transcendental subjectivity and phenomenological ramifications of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. Consciousness is fundamentally constituted of cultural, linguistic, and historical dimensions. Bernstein tries to widen the context of subjectivity and claims that modern discussions to the foundations of science and human action must consider thinkers such as Gadamer and Habermas, who suggested that one cannot reach absolute truth because truth is subjective.
Husserl based his notion on transcendental subjectivity. The Cartesian obsession with calculation and mathematical objectivity gave rise to the realization of what Nietzsche called perspectivism, which is the inescapable fact that any and all consciousnesses exist in space and time; that consciousness is fundamentally constituted of cultural, linguistic, and historical dimensions.
Each knowing subject is situated, and this is itself a universal fact. Another focus of this paper, then, is the analysis of the subjectivity of one type of knowledge: scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge cannot be entirely objective because it only represents the intersubjective agreement of a community of scholars. There is no method that can see and measure everything because each phenomenon has what Husserl calls a different ontological structure.
Finally, this paper lays foundations for more research on the explanation of the role of subjectivity in science and absolutism. Subjectivity and relativism according to Bernstein In Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis , Bernstein tries to widen the context of subjectivity and claims that modern discussions on the foundations of science and human action must consider thinkers such as Gadamer and Habermas, who put forward the idea that one cannot reach absolute truth because truth is subjective.
Subjectivity is essentially self-awareness or self-consciousness. As discussed by Bernstein, the Cartesian tradition implies self-awareness, the idea that the human being is aware of his or her inner representations and that his or her mind infers the existence of a thinking subject from such awareness.
Those misrepresentations would be a function of the individual perspectives and value systems of the scientist. They are both isms as such.
Many have complained about his choice of the word subjective with regard to transcendental subjectivity, but there it is. We are aware of both subjectivity and objectivity, and, at the level of pure awareness, they are equal metaphysically and ontologically. Objectivity is a phenomenon just like subjectivity and it has no priority or privilege.
Bernstein confuses transcendental subjectivity with mundane subjectivity. This is a huge mistake by Bernstein. Husserl is saying that we all have a pure awareness pure meaning prior to metaphysical judgments and that, from this level of pure awareness, we experience both attitudes objectivist and subjectivist and that they have different meanings.
As attitudes, they are identical. They are metaphysical prejudices that need to be bracketed so we can study phenomena without bias—be they logic, dreams, hunches, rocks, equations, or molecules. From this vantage point, subjectivity and objectivity are both metaphysical judgments and ideologies and they both arise together.
We are aware of them in the same way—transcendental awareness. Once we bracket the metaphysical judgment, then we can step back, as it were and see them both for what they are: ideologies, perspectives, and judgments and then we can see them as identical.
There are two sides of the same coin. What is objectivism? It is an ism. What is subjectivism? It too is an ism. They are phenomena that share qualities, the qualities of being not things but ideologies. We can identify when and where they became important—the enlightenment, in parts of Western Europe. This obsession with metaphysical judgment turns out to not be shared by hardly any other culture.
For magic peoples, for instance, spirits and dreams may be more real, more significant, than rocks and wood. So, this ideological conflict between subjectivity and objectivity turns out to be very ethnocentric, very much a child of the European enlightenment. This is why Gadamer turns against what he calls the enlightenment prejudice against prejudice as irrational. We cannot escape limitations. Science is not an object with bumps and polka dots.
By bracketing metaphysical judgment, Husserl enables us to validly investigate all phenomena without prejudice, be they math as in his own case or rocks. Husserl also went on to establish the necessary conditions for objectivity: intersubjective agreement.
Here, Husserl is speaking of subjectivity in its mundane sense, not as transcendental awareness. However, from the vantage of transcendental awareness, we are able to step back and investigate this process of communicating mundane subjects and how they do it.
We must investigate the necessary conditions for agreeing. Husserl says, it is transcendental linguisticality; that is, the human capacity for language, which is not limited to any one mundane subject and to synchronize through the process of convention on a code that enables meaning to be generated and shared. What enables this process of convention is communication itself and the rules of convening. Here, we are brushing up against Noam Chomsky and Martin Heidegger.
There is growing evidence that these scholars were right, that the physical brain is a sociocommunicative product and that the brain changes its physical structure as it acquires language, and that these neuronets constitute a specifically linguistic consciousness. The human being inventing signs is at the same time the human being who becomes ever more keenly conscious of himself. Yet, Nietzsche also realizes that this is merely self-consciousness and that this involves the emergence of ego.
As dimensions accrue, dissociation increases, which means that the ego slowly emerges from oceanic consciousness to borrow from Freud into collectivism toward increasing individualism. The enlightenment is the age of ideology and modern ego.
Bernstein , Giles , and Hall note how the more individualistic a culture, the more people in that culture talk—and the more verbal they become i. It is a will to power. Leaders are rhetoricians. Power in academe comes from publishing—words, words, words, from magic incantation to mental—rational formulation.
So, we divide everything into more and more words, smaller measures hours, minutes, and seconds; less tolerance in machining the world , and specialized vocabularies. In this manner, we can better conceptualize, categorize, and comprehend. The limitations of knowledge: intersubjective agreement, not objectivity Objectivity is the belief that there exists some sort of permanent, ahistorical truth, or knowledge framework.
Objectivity is an untenable form of rationality. Now we understand it. Meaning cannot be objective because there is no meaning without a mind Crotty Society determines what is true and false, right and wrong. What we think is true is a collective delusion from which no one can escape. There is no Truth. With no possibility to reason among the groups, the only alternatives are either ethnocentrism or intergroup comparison e.
The existence of a world without human minds is conceivable; yet, meaning without human minds is inconceivable Guba and Lincoln Meaning stems from intersubjective agreement or intersubjective conceptions of objectivity Gauker Habermas attacks the commonly held belief that knowledge is limited to empirically testable propositions reached through disinterested, value-free inquiry, a notion that lies at the core of both positivism and objectivist rhetoric.
Since people engage in consensual communication in order to achieve intersubjective agreement, they should not try to win an argument at any cost, but, instead, should listen to the other participants. As Habermas says, the goal of communication is to reach agreement. Nothing more than this: something strange is to be reduced to something familiar… what is familiar means what we are used to so that we no longer marvel at it… something that no longer disturbs us.
Is not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who attain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security? This is done through communication with the world, be it in what moderns call a methodical fashion or in a less managed way. In the end, it is about self-efficacy and power. Science, with its practical expression as technology, is hardly objective unless one counts the will to power, the will to confront and control natural forces, a mission without desire, will, direction, or purpose—in a word, human, all too human motivation.
Science works because no knowledge is ever taken as being final. Any method in the social sciences is limited in that it cannot deal with the unique, especially when it comes to analyzing human behavior.
A scientific method attempts to find a pattern among things that are timeless, universal, dependable, and replicable. In fact, what is crucial to scientific method is experimental repeatability or reproducibility Moore Yet, things that are unique or that do not fall into these categories are outside the realm of science.
Moore adds that, the important distinction between science and those other systematizations the arts, philosophy, and theology is that science is self-testing and self-correcting.
The testing and correcting are done by means of observations that can be repeated with essentially the same results by normal persons operating by the same methods and with the same approach. It is a heuristic model designed with a view to ensuring that the results have certain preconceived properties. Therefore, the statistical model, and any scientific method, is preconceived, prejudiced, and biased, because it is humanly made.
Plus, going back to the idea of repeatability, replication also has to do with claims to objectivity based on intersubjective agreement. There are well known epistemological problems with this. Equally important, despite a large number of observations and a large number of cases showing consistency generated through a method, it can never be guaranteed that the next event would not be contrary to it.
Henceforth, repeated observation cannot ultimately explain induction. For example, no matter how many white swans we may have seen in our lifetime, it does not imply that all swans are white; the next that we see may be black Popper Finally, subjectivity may emerge when the variables measured are intangible.
These variables are known as constructs Kaplan While constructs cannot be measured directly, there may be some questions about them being real, in the sense that they are directly observable and are constructed from measurements of other variables.
A scientific method does not immunize us from ourselves, but, instead, it institutionalizes our prejudices. After all, a method is always designed by someone. In other words, their mode of being varies.
Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis
Bernstein limits his interpretation of subjectivity to thinkers such as Gadamer and Habermas. The authors analyze the ideas of classic scholars such as Edmund Husserl and Friedrich Nietzsche. Husserl put forward his notion of transcendental subjectivity and phenomenological ramifications of the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. Consciousness is fundamentally constituted of cultural, linguistic, and historical dimensions. Bernstein tries to widen the context of subjectivity and claims that modern discussions to the foundations of science and human action must consider thinkers such as Gadamer and Habermas, who suggested that one cannot reach absolute truth because truth is subjective. Husserl based his notion on transcendental subjectivity. The Cartesian obsession with calculation and mathematical objectivity gave rise to the realization of what Nietzsche called perspectivism, which is the inescapable fact that any and all consciousnesses exist in space and time; that consciousness is fundamentally constituted of cultural, linguistic, and historical dimensions.
Bernstein Read preview Synopsis Drawing freely and expertly from Continental and analytic traditions, Richard Bernstein examines a number of debates and controversies exemplified in the works of Gadamer, Habermas, Rorty, and Arendt. He argues that a "new conversation" is emerging about human rationality--a new understanding that emphasizes its practical character and has important ramifications both for thought and action. Excerpt Writing, for me, has always been an adventure of discovery. This book itself is a stage in a personal and intellectual odyssey -- one which has opened new horizons of questioning. In Praxis and Action , where I explored the meaning and centrality of the concepts of praxis and action in Marxism, Existentialism, Pragmatism, and Analytic Philosophy, I wrote in the introduction: At first, it was the common negative stance of contemporary philosophers that most forcefully struck me. Most contemporary philosophers have been in revolt against the Cartesian framework.
It refers to any manufacturers of dairy products. Bernstein, is a good introduction to hermeneutic issues and, in general, a sensible response to the questions raised by hermeneutic considerations. Although hermeneutics burst forth as a major trend in 20th century philosophy in about the last thirty years, after steadily building up to that during the entire century, the hermeneutic tradition is almost as old as philosophy itself. One of the most significant events in the history of interpretation may have come with Philo Judaeus c. Since there was nothing obvious about that, it brings home the truth that the meaning of something is not always obvious, and that very unobvious kinds of interpretations can be imposed on given texts.